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NOTES

DOES A PROMISE MADE WITHOUT INTENT TO PERFORM IT
CONSTITUTE FRAUD IN PENNSYLVANIA?
Suppose A tells B, "If you will sell me your property, I will use it only for
dwelling-house purposes." They make a written contract to sell and later a deed,
but no mention is made of the limitation in either instrument. The promise forms
no part of the consideration, and the parol evidence rule estops B from asserting
it as a term of the contract. The deed is in fee simple without limitation. Is B
left without a remedy if A breaks his promise?
Suppose A never intended to keep his promise-is this such fraud as will
support an action for damages or recission at law, or a suit for equitable relief, in
Pennsylvania? 1
"The word 'fraud' is a generic term which embraces a great variety of actionable wrongs." 2 Like the term "malice," it is one of those legal catch-alls which
must be redefined in virtually every case.3 The term will be used here as it is
used in the common law action of deceit.
The elements of that action are, briefly:
(1) A false representation (2) of material facts (3) made with
knowledge of the falsity (4) to one who is ignorant of the falsity (5)
with intention that it shall be relied upon; and (6) a change in position
by the victim in reliance thereon to his injury. 4
Since the courts of Pennsylvania have until recently6 combined the functions
of law and equity, the elements of common law deceit, which is an action for damages, have come to be virtually the same as those in an action for avoidance or
recission at law or at equity. One may safely say that where the facts are such as
warrant an action of deceit, they also will warrant an avoidence or recission.
•

•

•

•

•

•

In the case of Standard Interlock Elevator Company v. Wilson,6 decided in

1907, the plaintiff sold a safety device for an elevator, to be installed at such date
I See 2 Okla. L. Rev. 365; 21 Tulane L. Rev. 639; 27 Tex. L. Rev. 389; 15 J. Bar A. Kan. 305.
See also 23 Am. Jur. §§ 35-44 and § 48; 71 A.L.R. 78, 117; 68 A.L.R. 638; 91 A.L.R. 1300. For
text materials, see Williston on Sales, rev. ed., 1948, vol. 3, §§ 624 et. seq.; Prosser on Torts, 1941,
§§ 85 et seq.; Restatement of Contracts, § 473; Restatement of Torts, § 544.
2 La Course v. Kiesel, 366 Pa. 385, 77 A.2d 877 (1951). See also In re Thorne's Estate, 344 Pa.
503, 25 A.2d 811; In re Reichert's Estate, 356 Pa. 269, 51 A.2d 615; In re McClellan's Estate,
365 Pa. 401, 75 A.2d 595.
3 Prosser on Torts, 1941, p. 704.
4 Ibid., p. 706; Williston on Sales, vol. 3 § 624. See also Berwick Hotel Co. v. Vaughn, 300
Pa. 389, 150 A. 613, 71 A.L.R. 1340.
5 Fisher, The Administration of Equity through Common Law Forms in Pennsylvania, 1 L.Q.
Rev. 455 (1885), reprinted in 2 Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History 810 (1908);
Cowan, Legislative Equity in Pennsylvania, 4 U. of Pitt. L. Rev. 1 (1937).
6 218 Pa. 504, 67 A. 463. See also Purcell v. Binns, 298 Pa. 447; Zettlemoyer et al. v. Block et
al., 329 Pa. 205, 198 A. 80; Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., v. Simpson, 293 Pa. 577, 143 A. 202,
modifying 10 D. & C. 403; McCreary v. Edwards, 113 Pa. Super. 151, 172 A. 166.
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as the buyer might name. The buyer refused to name a date and plaintiff sued
for breach of contract. Defendant raised the affirmative defense of fraud, claiming he was induced to buy through plaintiff's representations that he (plaintiff)
was about to join a trust for controlling the sale of safety devices. Plaintiff knew
his representations to be false when he made them.
The court, in deciding that the defense was valid, said:
"Although it is true that false statements, to be deemed fraudulent
in law, must relate to something represented as an existing fact, a statement apparently of intent, purpose or opinion only, may amount to a
statement of fact where a person fraudulently misrepresents his intent in doing a particular act to the damage of another." This was by no means a new idea, although it had not been so clearly or
openly expressed before. The court cited the cases of Williams v. Kerr,7 and Sutton v. Morgan,8 both of which had been decided around 1900. But the idea had
been hinted at as early as 1867, in the leading case of Grove v. Hodges.9 The
language of that case, often cited as the parent fraud case in Pennsylvania, 10 is
significant:
"Fraud consists in false representations of things as facts which are
not such... A promise is not, in itself, a false and deceitful representation. Performance may have been intended when the promise was made."
(Emphasis supplied.)
So it has been recognized quite often that a promise made without intent to
perform it may be fraud in Pennsylvania. The case of Williams v. Kerr, supra,
was a suit in equity for a decree of reconveyance of land, where the landowner
was induced to sell by the buyer's false representation that he would build a machine shop and foundry on the land. This decision followed a line of cases going
back to Hoge v. Hogei in 1832, where a testator was induced to devise land by the
fraudulent representation of the devisee that he would hold the land for another's
benefit. The court decreed a trust in favor of the third party. In a similar case
in 1873, where a grantor was induced to confide in another's verbal assurance
that he would buy land for the grantor's benefit at a sheriff's sale, and in reliance upon that, permitted the defendant to become holder of legal title, a subsxluent refusal to deed over the land was held to be such fraud as will convert
the grantee into a trustee ex maleficio.i2
The case of Sutton v. Morgan also was a suit in equity for reconveyance. The
buyer was induced to buy through the false representations of the seller that there
7 152 Pa. 560, 25 A. 618 (1891).
8 158 Pa. 204, 27 A. 894, 38 Am.St.Rep. 841 (1893).
9 55 Pa. 504 (1867).
10 23 Am. Jur. 35; 7 R.C.L. 239; R.C.L., Perm. Supp. (1947); 51 A.L.R. 108; 68 A.L.R. 642.
This case is cited in numerous Pennsylvania decisions; see especially Berwick Hotel v. Vaughn,
4, supra.
1 1 Watts 163 (1832).
12 Wolford v. Herrington, 74 Pa. 311, 15 Am.St.Rep. 548 (1873).
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was a great demand for lots on the land, that a railroad was about to move its
shops nearby, and that a syndicate of prominent men had been formed to secure
the land and had offered more than the contract price for the land. This case, it
will be noted, could easily have been decided on the grounds of ordinary common
law deceit, since the representations were partly of present and past fact.
.

0

0

0

The Standard case in 1907 was the last case in which the decision was based
solely on the fact that on'e party misrepresented his intent to act in the future. 13
A great number of cases since that time have dealt with the problem, and virtually
all of them, with a few distinguishable exceptions, 14 have recognized the rule of
the Standard case. But from 1907 until the present day, not a single Pennsylvania
Supreme or Superior Court decision has followed the Standard rule in the absence
of evidence which could of itself have brought the case legitimately to the same
result on other grounds.
There is ample reason for this. Perhaps a quotation from a recent case, Fidurski v. Hammill,16 will serve to illustrate:

"The mere failure to perform a promise will not sustain an action
for deceit. An unperformepromise does not give rise to a presumption
that the promisor intended not to perform when the promise was made,
and a fraudulent intention will not be inferred merely from nonperformance. . . . A promise to do something which is not subsequently
complied with does not constitute fraud. There is not a particle of evidence in this case from which it could be inferred that the defendant had
any dishonest intention ...
"
There is the problem. The gist of the fraud involved in this type of case is
not in breach of contract' 6 nor in the misrepresentation of some easily demonstrable fact.' 7 It is in the promisor's state of mind, in a false representation of
existing intent to perform where such intent is in fact non-existent, and in the
deception of the obligee by that representation.

18 With the possible exception of a few very recent Pennsylvania decisions to be discussed later.
14 See especially the case of Lowry National Bank v. Hazard et al., 223 Pa. 520, 72 A. 889, decided just two years after the Standard case. Even those cases which did not mention the Standard
rule did not expressly deny it. It was overlooked or ignored in several cases, however. But it is
the opinion of the writer that it would have made no difference in the decisions. Most of the
cases involved (and they have been very few) are readily distinguishable on the facts. Those
which are not, do not depend on the Standard rule.
15 Fidurski et ux. v. Hammill, 328 Pa. 1, 195 A. 3 (1937). See also the cases of Klerlein v. Werver, 307 Pa. 16, 23, 160 A. 719; Martachowski v. Orawitz, 14 Pa. Super. 175; Warren Balderston
Co. v. Integrity Trust Company, 314 Pa. 58, 170 A. 282.
16 "A contract will not generally be invalidated by reason of a total or partial failure to comply
with an agreement, as by failure to pay the sum agreed upon by neglect or refusal, for in such case
the plaintiff has a remedy based on his contract to recover." Maguire v. Wheeler, 300 Pa. 513,
150 A. 882; see also Krebs v. Stroub, 116 Pa. 405, 9 A. 469.
17 That is, a fact other than the state of mind of the promisor at the time the promise was made.
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Agreed that the promisor should be held responsible for his misrepresentations-how may it be proved that the promisor had no intent to perform at the
time the promise was made?
Note that the Fidurski case clearly states that lack of intent to perform will
not be presumed. This seems reasonable enough. The mere fact of nonperformance, though it may be sufficient to permit recovery in breach of contract, surely is not of itself indicative of a fraudulent intent at the time the promise was
8
made. On this point the cases are agreed.'
But if such intent is not to be presumed, how may it be shown? The decisions
are not very helpful. Perhaps a few quotations may point out the.problem:
"Fraud may be predicated on the nonperformance of a promise in
certain cases where the promise is the device to accomplish the fraud." 19
"We deem it unnecessary to discuss the question, because if a fraudulent intent is to be established, it must at least be proved by proper evidence. There is no evidence in this case from20which it may be inferred
that the defendant had any dishonest intent."
"...Of course, a promise to do something in the future in itself
does not constitute fraud, but fraud may be predicated on the nonperfor2
mance of a promise made as a device to accomplish the fraud." '
"There
must be bad faith; an intent at the time to defraud the
22
seller."
"The mere failure to carry out a promise of something to be done
in the future is not itself evidence of fraud, and we must find support
for the allegation of fraud in other circumstances showing that the promise
28
was but a device fraudulently contrived to take advantage of another."
Apparently since 1907 no one has been able to prove successfully that the
promise was a "device to accomplish the fraud" except by introducing one of two
additional elements. They are (1) a confidential relationship between the parties
and (2) an express or implied statement of fact other than the fact of existing intent, made in conjunction with or implied by the promise.
A case illustrating the first of these is McCreary v. Edwards,2 4 where the
court said:
"Fraud may be predicated on the nonperformance of a promise in
certain cases where the promise is the device to accomplish the fraud...
or where a relationship of trust and confidence exist between the parties."
18 Purcell v. Binns, 298 Pa. 447, 148 A. 516, 517; Zettlemoyer et ux. v. Block et al., 329 Pa.
205, 198 A. 80; McCreary v. Edwards, 113 Pa. Super. 151, 172 A. 166. These are representative
cases.
19 McCreary v. Edwards, n. 18, supra. See also Pusic v. Salak, 261 Pa. 514, 104 A. 751, quot.
ing 12 R.C.L. 251.
20 Purcell v. Binns, supra.
21 Commonwealth v. Meyer, 169 Pa. Super. 40 (1951).
22 Rodman et al. v. Thalheimer, 75 Pa. 232; see also Smith v. Smith, 21 Pa. 367, and Penn

Lumber Co. v. Hanover, 96 Pa. Super 16.
28 McCreary v. Edwards, supra.
24 N. 19, supra.
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The court cited the case of Maguire v. Wheeler25 as standing for that proposition. That case involved a lawyer-client relationship and said simply:
"If the person making the promise intended at the time not to perform it, thus fraudulently making usL of the promise as a device to procure the contract or deed, equity will grant relief."
The case of Murphy v. Greybill 26 illustrates the second type. The decision
reads:
"An unfulfilled promise is only fraud if it is connected with a misrepresentation respecting alleged facts, or falsely holds out a prospect
of collateral advantages that lead the seller to accept a price far below the
real value of the property parted with."
Both the McCreary case and the Murphy case, though apparently swayed by
the Standard rule, were in fact decided on other grounds. The former involved
so-called "constructive fraud," 2 7 i.e., fraud which does not depend on good or
bad faith and does not require dishonest intent to be actionable. The latter was a
case which could have been decided by a literal interpretation of the rule of common-law deceit, as stated by the court in Berwick Hotel Company v. Vaughn:28
-...
Itmust be alleged and proved that there was a false statement
of facts made with fraudulent intent which was relied on, and, as a general rule, a statement, to constitute a false and fraudulent representation,
must be a representation of fact, and not a mere expression of opinion,
belief, or prediction ... "
Of course, the rule of the Standard case is that a promise may be a statement
of fact. But, where a representation of fact already 'exists, why go further?

We have seen that the courts of Pennsylvania have paid lip-service to the
Standard rule, but have been extremely reluctant to apply it. It may now be queried-will the Pennsylvania courts apply the rule in a proper case? As the Minne2
sota court recently observed: 9
"There is a growing unwillingness on the part of the courts to allow
the statements to e ma e without liability which are calculated to induce,
and which do induce, action on the part of the hearer. Where a statement
is made with fraudulent intent, there is still more reason for regarding
it as a ground for liability, even though couched in the form of a promise
or though it relates to a matter as to which certainty is impossible."
25
26
27
28

N. 16, supra.
34 Pa. Super. 339 (1907).
17A C.J.S. 5, 6. See also 77 A.2d 877.
N. 4, supra.
29 Schmitt v. Ornes Esswein & Co., 149 Minn. 370, 183 N.W. 840 (1921).
Contracts, § 474; Restatement of Restitution, § 8, comment d.

Cf., Restatement of

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

VOL. 57

This attitude seems to be gaining ground in Pennsylvania and in other liberal
jurisdictions. The old "dog-eat-dog" viewpoint of the early common law is gradually giving way to a sense of social responsibility on the part of the courts.
A few recent lower court decisions 80 were made in favor of advocates of the
Standard rule, and the courts apparently did not rely upon the two additional elements usually found in such cases. Two recent federal decisions s recognized the
rule as Pennsylvania law, and applied it as such. The appellate courts of Pennsylvania also seem to have recognized the rule, although in an oblique way, in
two recent cases, one involving criminal law,82 and the other dealing with an Office of Price Stabilization (O.P.S.) regulation.8 8
It would seem, then, that there is a strong possibility that the Pennsylvania
courts will recognize as fraud a promise to perform where no intent to do so exists,
IF adequate proof of the fraudulent intent existing as of the time the promise was
made is presented. What kind of proof? That is the sixty-four dollar question,
and the courts offer no hint as to the answer.
Gerald H. Goldberg
Member of the Senior Class
80 Leedom v. Weaver, 28 Del. 352; Dunlop v. Freeman, 7 Fay. L. J. 5; also, 2 Lycoming 42.
These cases were decided in 1939, 1944, and 1950, respectively.
81 Boulevard Airport v. Consolidated Vultee, 85 F.Supp. 876 (1949), and Toner v. Sobelman,
86 F.Supp. 369 (1949).
82 Commonwealth v. Meyer, 169 Pa. Super. 40 (1951). Here a prisoner represented that he was
of a "penitent state of mind," thus obtaining a parole. The court said this was, in effect, a promise,
and, citing the Standard case, revoked the parole.
38 Crawford et ux v. Pituch et ux, Pa. , 84 A.2d 204, also a 1951 case, involved a false
statement by a landlord that he desired an apartment occupied by plaintiff for his own use and
occupancy, whereupon tenant moved and landlord rented to a third person at a higher rental.
Held: The tenant may maintain an action for common law deceit. However, the court stated that
the decision was based on federal case holdings under the O.P.S., and cited no Pennsylvania cases.

